


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**AN ANALYSIS OF THE TERRORIST THREAT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR A FREE AMERICA**

by

Kevin Eugene Bannister

Bachelor of Science
United States Air Force Academy, 1989

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Chapter One: Introduction

The threat of terrorism became a central issue of American foreign policy during the decade of the eighties; during the decade terrorism claimed more lives than during the two previous decades combined (Hoffman, 1993b). The decade began with Americans held hostage by terrorists in Iran. Americans were killed by terrorists when Trans World Airlines Flight 847 and the cruise ship Achilles Lauro were hijacked. Perhaps the most spectacular and most deadly act of terrorism perpetrated against Americans at that time occurred in 1983, when terrorists exploded a car bomb outside the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon and killed 241 (Public report, 1986). The Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism (1986) declared that although Americans did not view terrorism as having a direct affect upon their lives, they viewed terrorism as one of the most serious topics of concern for the United States government. In response to the growing threat of terrorism, the Reagan administration and then the Bush administration placed heavy emphasis upon combating terrorism. However, the media spotlight focused upon terrorist attacks on American assets overseas (Simon, 1990).

Having downsized its domestic intelligence operations in the wake of public and Congressional disapproval of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) misconduct brought to light by the Watergate hearings, the FBI initially resisted the efforts of President Reagan

and many Republicans in Congress who called for increased expenditures and emphasis for counterterrorism. However, by the early 1980s public opinion had shifted from its anti-establishment attitude of the sixties and seventies; and, with the Iranian hostage affair still remembered, members of two radical, left wing extremist groups committed terrorist acts which aroused public attention to demand response from the government (Smith, 1994). In 1982, President Reagan issued an Executive Order which made the FBI the lead agency for combatting terrorism in the United States. Within six months, the FBI elevated their counterterrorism program from a level three priority to a level one priority program, the highest priority (Terrorism and America, 1993). The following year the guidelines for conducting domestic security investigations were relaxed (Smith, 1994). By Presidential mandate, the FBI became the focal point for the newly emerging national strategy for combating domestic terrorism and the cornerstone was laid for the nation's domestic counterterrorism program. The elevation of counterterrorism to a national priority provided the FBI with the support to become very active combating several different terrorist groups operating in the United States, and to effectively neutralize many of the threats while creating a very successful counterterrorist program.

Although the FBI documented 219 official acts of terrorism in the eighties, Americans believed themselves to be immune to terrorism at home (Smith, 1994). Although terrorists had been active in the United States since the sixties, there were no spectacular incidents which the media seized upon. Also, terrorist attacks in the United States were largely focused at buildings and other symbolic structures and therefore produced significantly fewer casualties than those acts of terrorism committed in other

countries (Hoffman, 1993b). This sense of invulnerability was shattered on February 26, 1993, when Islamic fundamentalists exploded a car bomb in the garage of the World Trade Center in New York City causing over one thousand casualties. Media attention, and consequently public attention, focused upon the threat foreign terrorists posed to America (Hoffman, 1993b). When a car bomb exploded outside the federal building in Oklahoma City causing 167 deaths, Americans feared foreign terrorists had struck again. Later, Americans were surprised to learn that the terrorist attackers were actually Americans (The end of the innocence, 1995). The nation now had to accept the fact that the United States was threatened from terrorism from within as well as from outside its borders.

Terrorism, from external as well as internal sources, poses a threat to the United States. Many terrorist organizations have been active inside the country and a significant number continue to pose a threat. Current threats are thought to include radical Islamic fundamentalists, left wing Marxist extremists, right wing white supremacists and survivalists, Puerto Rican separatists, and radical environmental terrorists (Smith, 1994). Independent scholars as well as specialists working for the Rand Corporation, the federal government, and independently have predicted that the threat of terrorism will most likely increase. In addition, they have predicted that terrorist attacks will likely become more lethal in order to compete for publicity and because of the driving ideologies of some groups (Hoffman, 1993a). Some organizations have demonstrated a willingness to inflict mass casualties in the furthering of their aims. The FBI discovered that one right wing organization had planned to contaminate the Washington, D.C. water supply with arsenic (Smith, 1994). The growing lethality of terrorist attacks coupled with the willingness to

cause mass casualties has led some to question the possible use of super terrorism, which is the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons by terrorists (Hoffman, 1993a). Such use of chemical weapons has already occurred in 1995, when Japanese terrorists released deadly sarin gas in the Tokyo subways causing many casualties (Hanson, 1995). As already mentioned, the FBI increased its efforts to combat terrorism in 1982. Since that time, the agency has succeeded in disrupting many terrorist organizations and bringing many terrorists to justice. However, as evidenced by the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, terrorism exists in the United States. The continued existence of terrorism added to the predictions mentioned above have lead many government officials and experts to warn that terrorism will continue to pose a significant threat to the United States. In light of the threat, the question to be asked is how prepared is the United States to effectively combat the threat?

This research project has attempted to answer that question. Chapter two of this study examines the process by which the FBI came to be designated the lead agency for combating terrorism in the United States and the background behind the creation of a national strategy for combating domestic terrorism. The next chapter examines the extent of past terrorist activity in the United States to determine what the level of terrorism was in the eighties and early nineties and demonstrates the significant level of terrorism that has existed in the United States since 1980. This portion of the study reports the number of terrorist acts that occurred in America and what groups were responsible for these acts. In addition, the efforts of the FBI have been provided to demonstrate the relatively high degree of success the agency has achieved in neutralizing many terrorist threats.

The next section of the analysis examines the state of preparedness of the United States to combat terrorism. Most programs for fighting terrorism have been composed of proactive and reactive elements, antiterrorism and counterterrorism, respectively (Tompkins, 1984). As with fighting crime, emphasis must be placed on prevention to save lives and resources. By studying the antiterrorism program of the United States, the capability to prevent terrorism may be better evaluated. Both the efforts of the federal government as well as the efforts of the state and lower governments are discussed in an attempt to establish the level of preparedness to prevent terrorist attacks. Once accomplished, a study of the counterterrorism program of the United States follows. Again like crime, terrorism cannot be completely eliminated; therefore a response capability must be possessed. The level of preparedness for a response to terrorism at all levels of government completes the section of the analysis.

Finally, the threat of terrorism is discussed in regard to possible trends. Insight is provided into what the future nature of the terrorist threat may be like and what implications for the future may be in store. The past history of terrorism in the United States combined with the future implications regarding terrorism join to demonstrate the significance that the threat of terrorism poses to the future of the United States. Although terrorism is not likely to topple the government of the United States or develop into the problem faced by some other nations, the threat is of substantial significance to warrant concern and to demand preparedness on the part of those agencies charged with combating the threat.

Once the analysis of the threat has been accomplished, an answer is formulated to the question of how prepared the United States is to effectively counter the threat of terrorism. The threat perceived from international terrorism steadily grew from the sixties to an all-time high in the eighties (Smith, 1994). In the nineties, spectacular terrorist attacks within the borders of the United States focused media and national attention on the threat terrorism posed to the safety of Americans at home (The end of the innocence, 1995). The shield of America's invulnerability to terrorism was destroyed and the nation was forced to reexamine its perceptions concerning the potential for violent terrorist activity within the United States. The threat posed by terrorism to the United States, especially if terrorists use of weapons of mass destruction is considered, demands that the leaders of the nation ask the questions: Is the United States aware of the potential threats posed by terrorism, and is the United States sufficiently prepared to combat those threats? This study examines these questions and attempts to provide some answers.

Chapter Two: A Change in Policy

Americans and American assets have been a favorite target for terrorist attacks overseas since the late sixties, and consequently the problem of terrorism has been a significant foreign policy issue (Hoffman, 1993b). However, in the eighties the problem of terrorism became a significant domestic policy issue as well; events occurred which drastically changed the manner in which the nation viewed the problem of terrorism in America. From these events and the changes they inspired evolved the nation's strategy for combating terrorism, and the FBI emerged as the focal point for the nation's fight against terrorism in America.

The 1960s and 1970s were a period of turmoil and social unrest in the United States. The civil rights movement and the anti-war movement produced some significant public disorder demonstrations and generally produced significant elements in society that were dissatisfied with and distrustful of the government, or the establishment (Jenkins, 1980). From this period emerged two factors which would ultimately influence the political decisions in the early 1980s concerning the federal government's stance on the combating of terrorism in America. First, the anti-war movement produced several left wing, Marxist extremists who later became some of the most significant terrorist threats (Jenkins, 1980). Second, events such as the police riot at the Democratic National

Convention in Chicago in 1968 decreased the American public's faith and trust in the government and its police agencies (Useem & Kimball, 1991).

Once respected as America's elite crime-fighting organization under Director Hoover, the FBI suffered a severe blow to its reputation in 1973. In that year the Watergate hearings revealed extensive FBI misconduct from the 1940s up to 1970, particularly concerning the conduct of domestic security investigations and intelligence gathering. As a result, significant changes were made which directly affected the Bureau's ability to combat terrorism. The agency's intelligence collection capability was severely limited as it dismantled many of its domestic intelligence units and stricter limitations were placed upon their ability to gather intelligence information concerning United States citizens. Consequently, the number of domestic security investigations conducted by the FBI dropped from over 20,000 in 1973, to less than 300 in 1976 (Smith, 1994). As a result of Congressional criticism and inquiries, Attorney General Edward Levi issued new guidelines for the conduct of internal security investigations in 1976. These Levi guidelines as they came to be called further restricted the manner and length of investigations. During the same year, FBI Director Clarence Kelley moved investigations of terrorist incidents from the Intelligence Division to the General Investigative Division. While the move limited the techniques which could be used to investigate terrorism to those used by routine criminal investigations, it signified that terrorist cases would be treated as criminal cases. Another director, William Webster, in another effort to distance the new FBI from the political police agency tarnished by the Watergate findings and

improve its image, changed the domestic security investigations to terrorism investigations (Smith, 1994).

The 1980s brought significant changes concerning the perceptions of the public and the government towards terrorism. The newly elected President Reagan and his administration as well as many Republican members of Congress criticized the FBI not for its over-reaching involvement in internal investigations and intelligence operations, but for the low priority given to domestic security and terrorism. Congressional criticisms of the FBI concerning due process abuses were replaced for criticisms concerning the lack of resources expended to combat terrorism (Smith, 1994).

Initially, the FBI under Director Webster resisted attempts both to move the FBI back into the realm of political policing and increase funding for terrorism investigations. Webster had systematically returned appropriations for the counterterrorism program to Congress since the late 1970s. During the appropriations hearings for fiscal year 1982, Webster proposed that FBI counterterrorism funding be reduced by \$250,000 and that 21 positions be reallocated or eliminated from the program (Smith, 1994). Webster stated, "There is no known coalescing of an ideological synthesis among domestic terrorist groups, nor do we have any sense that they have become effective," (Smith, 1994, p. 9). The events of late 1981 proved Webster's comments to be inopportune.

In October 1981, the May 19th Communist Organization (M19CO) robbed a Brinks armored car in Nyack, New York, killing two police officers and a security guard in the process. Created in the late 1970s, the M19CO's membership roster was composed of left-wing extremists who had at one time been members of some of the most notorious

organizations including the Students for a Democratic Society, the Weather Underground, the Black Panther party, the Black Liberation Army, and the Republic of New Africa (Hoffman, 1988). Evidence was later discovered which revealed the group had been successful in bringing about the escape of JoAnne Chesimard from the New Jersey State Prison in 1979, where she was serving a life plus 26 to 33-year sentence for the murder of a New Jersey state trooper. Once they had freed the leader of the Black Liberation Army, the M19CO successfully kept Chesimard hidden and arranged for her to flee to Cuba. During the same year the group successfully helped William Morales, the leader of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), escape from Bellevue Hospital, where he was taken after he was arrested when a FALN bomb factory in Queens, New York exploded (Smith, 1994).

In December 1981, members of the United Freedom Front (UFF) killed a New Jersey state trooper during a routine traffic stop. The group followed a Marxist ideology and opposed American imperialism and American foreign policy in Central America. The UFF was formed in 1975 by former members of the Students for a Democratic Society who were involved in attempts to unionize and radicalize prisoners (Smith, 1994). From 1975 to 1981, the group conducted three armed robberies and eight bombings and its members were highly successful at evading the authorities (Smith, 1994).

With the President and Congress pushing for more expenditures and emphasis on counterterrorism, the public aroused by the acts of the M19CO and the UFF and concerned with the reemergence of radicalism, and with the already heightened general concerns about terrorism resulting from the Iranian hostage crisis, Director Webster and

the FBI were forced to revitalize the agency's counterterrorism program (Smith, 1994). In April of 1982, President Reagan issued an Executive Order which designated the FBI as the specific lead agency responsible for combating terrorism in the United States, and gave the Department of State the responsibility for coordinating the counterterrorism efforts of the United States abroad. Six months later, the FBI elevated their counterterrorism program from a level three priority to the highest priority, level one (Terrorism and America, 1993). The following year, Attorney General William French Smith issued new guidelines for conducting domestic security and terrorism investigations. The Smith Guidelines relaxed the restrictions imposed by the Levi Guidelines, provided greater flexibility to the FBI concerning terrorism investigations, and streamlined the investigation process (Smith, 1994). Indicative of the government's greater emphasis on domestic terrorism, the Rand Corporation, which had compiled chronologies of international terrorist incidents worldwide since 1968, began in 1983 to systematically record domestic terrorist incidents as well (Hoffman, 1988).

With the designation as lead agency, the FBI was made the focal point for domestic terrorism. The agency was also given the responsibility for determining which acts would be labeled as terrorism, and became a focal point of terrorism data collection in the United States (Smith, 1994). From these changes in the early 1980s, a perceptible national strategy for combating domestic terrorism evolved and was implemented by the FBI. Numerous FBI successes in neutralizing many terrorist organizations in the 1980s are described in the next chapter. Further refinements made in the 1980s, including Congressional legislation, recommendations from a Vice Presidential Task Force, and

experience gained combating terrorist organizations in the United States are also discussed in the next chapter. The national strategy for dealing with the problem of domestic terrorism in the 1990s and the years to come essentially had its birth with the events of the early 1980s.

Chapter Three: Terrorism in the United States

Amount of Terrorism

Compared to the amount of nonpolitical violence in the United States, the number of terrorist incidents which have occurred in America is statistically insignificant. In 1986, the FBI reported over 1.3 million acts of nonpolitical violence occurred, including almost 19,000 homicides (Hoffman, 1988). From 1980 to 1994, the FBI reported 247 acts of terrorism in America, resulting in less than 100 deaths (FBI, 1994, & Smith, 1994, & The Center for National Studies, 1995). Yet as statistically insignificant as the terrorist threat in America may seem, there remains an element of society which is committed to the use of violence in the pursuit of their objectives. The events of April 19, 1995, demonstrated that the terrorist threat is real and that terrorist activities in America do indeed warrant concern.

As mentioned above, 247 official acts of terrorism were recorded in the United States during the period 1980 to 1994 (FBI, 1994, & Smith, 1994, & The Center for National Studies, 1995). The FBI has maintained data regarding prevented acts of terrorism, which have not been included in the official count, since 1982 (Smith, 1994). As defined by the FBI, a prevented act of terrorism, or a terrorism prevention, is "a documented instance in which a violent act by a known or suspected terrorist group or individual with the means and a proven propensity for violence is successfully interdicted

through investigative activity, (FBI, 1994, p. 28). From 1982 to 1994, the FBI recorded 74 terrorism preventions in the United States (FBI, 1994, & Smith, 1994, & The Center for National Studies, 1995). Listed in Table 1 are the incidents of terrorism and terrorism preventions by year:

Table 1

Terrorist Incidents and Preventions Reported by the FBI, 1980-1994

Year	Incidents	Preventions
1980	29	Statistics unavailable
1981	42	
1982	51	3
1983	31	6
1984	13	9
1985	7	23
1986	25	9
1987	9	5
1988	8	3
1989	4	7
1990	7	5
1991	5	4
1992	4	0
1993	12	7
1994	0	0

Terrorism by Groups

During the beginning of the 1980s, international, Jewish, and Puerto Rican groups were the most active. The actions of international terrorist groups as well as actions by left-wing terrorist groups declined as the 1980s progressed. By the mid 1980s, incidents of right-wing terrorism began to occur. Towards the end of the decade, acts of single-

issue terrorism were noted. A compilation of terrorist incidents by group is provided below (FBI, 1994, & Smith, 1994, & The Center for National Studies, 1995):

Table 2

Terrorist Incidents by Major Groups, 1980-1994

Year	Inter- national	Right- Wing	Jewish	Left- Wing	Puerto Rican	Single- Issue
1980	6	0	1	3	12	0
1981	14	0	8	4	16	0
1982	15	0	8	3	25	0
1983	10	1	1	12	3	0
1984	0	0	1	7	5	0
1985	0	0	4	1	2	0
1986	0	5	2	0	17	1
1987	0	0	0	0	7	2
1988	1	0	0	0	5	2
1989	0	0	0	0	2	2
1990	0	1	0	0	5	1
1991	0	1	0	0	4	0
1992	2	0	0	0	2	0
1993	1	2	0	0	0	9
1994	0	0	0	0	0	0

International Terrorism

The bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, an act of international terrorism in the United States causing over one thousand casualties, was the most notable incident of terrorism to have occurred in the United States in modern history (FBI, 1994).

However, the World Trade Center bombing was only 1 of 49 incidents of terrorism which occurred in the United States during the period under study (Smith, 1994, & FBI, 1994).

Also during this time, several international terrorist organizations operated within the borders of the United States conducting terrorist-related activity, such as fund raising and weapons purchasing, and did not commit terrorist attacks within the United States. Other groups were prevented from carrying out terrorist attacks (Smith, 1994).

Armenian and Cuban terrorism.

Many ethnic groups have conducted terrorist activities and attacks within the United States which have had little relation to American political policy and consequently, these groups have not generally targeted American interests. Such groups have used the United States as the site of their battle against their perceived oppressors and enemies (Hoffman, 1988). These organizations have generally recruited from within their own communities and have not enjoyed wide-spread support outside of those communities. Most active among these types of groups have been the Armenians and the anti-Castro Cubans (Smith, 1994).

Armenian terrorists were active in the United States during the early 1980s in support of a world wide campaign to avenge the deaths of the many Armenians who were killed in 1915, when the Ottoman Empire expelled the Armenians who lived in eastern Turkey (Hoffman, 1988). The stated Armenian goal was to force the Turkish government to acknowledge the alleged genocide and make reparations to the families of the survivors. Consequently, most of the terrorist attacks conducted by Armenian terrorists in the United States were directed at Turkish targets and the interests of other foreign governments who had imprisoned Armenian terrorists. The peak of the groups terrorist activity was 1982, when the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles and Turkish Consul in Boston were

assassinated. During the same year, five Armenians were arrested when a plot to assassinate the Turkish Consul in Philadelphia was uncovered. The last reported act of Armenian terrorism occurred in 1983 (Hoffman, 1988).

During the trial of the Armenian-American terrorist who was convicted of murdering the Turkish Consul-General in Los Angeles, the defense focused on the defendant's political motivations to create the impression that he was a political prisoner. He was judged, however, as a criminal who committed a violent crime and was sentenced to life in prison with no chance of parole. Because of the manner of judgment and the negative connotations associated with supporting criminal violence, the large law-abiding and commercially successful Armenian population provided no overt support of the terrorists' actions. These events were held to be the reasons behind the decline of Armenian violence in America (Hoffman, 1988).

The anti-Castro Cuban terrorist groups in America were some of the most active organizations after Castro's assumption of power in Cuba to the early 1980s. Most members of these groups were expatriated Cubans who had suffered at the hands of Fidel Castro's regime and who sought to discredit the regime by disrupting foreign relations with Cuba to bring about the downfall of Castro and his communist government. By 1980, however, many of the expatriated Cubans had established themselves in the United States, it was evident that Castro would remain in power, and it was likewise evident that their efforts would not prove successful. Due to attrition, the only operational anti-Cuban terrorist organization active in the United States by 1980, was a group known as Omega 7 (Hoffman, 1988).

Eduardo Arocena and six other Cuban individuals formed Omega 7 in 1974 in New York. They began their terrorist actions in 1975 and conducted numerous bombings in the New York area to denounce Castro. After each incident, an anonymous member of Omega 7 would call the WCBS radio show in New York and claim responsibility (Smith, 1994). The attacks conducted by the members of Omega 7 against Cuban continued in the early eighties with more bombings and an attempted assassination (Smith, 1994).

The FBI began to close in on the Omega 7 in 1980. With the arrests of several key members, the group began to fall apart. On July 22, 1983, Arocena was arrested, subsequently convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment. By 1984, most of the members of Omega 7 had been imprisoned. The support of Cubans in America for the terrorists' cause declined as a result of their assimilation into American culture and the terrorists' alienation caused by their drug trafficking and other criminal actions to fund their activities. No further terrorist incidents were attributed to Omega 7 and only one more incident of Cuban terrorism occurred in the United States (Smith, 1994). In 1988, a group which called itself the Organization Alliance of Cuban Intransigence claimed responsibility for the bombing of the residence of the executive director of the Institute of Cuban Studies in Florida (FBI, 1990).

Middle Eastern terrorists.

Middle Eastern groups have committed some of the most infamous attacks in recent years, from the murder of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics to the bombing of the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in 1982 (Hoffman, 1988). Because of such attacks as well as the media attention given to them,

Middle Eastern terrorist organizations are often the first groups thought of by most Americans when terrorism is mentioned. When the federal building in Oklahoma City was bombed in April, 1995, the finger of blame was quickly pointed towards the Middle East, although it was later discovered that American right-wing extremists were the most probable suspects (Alter, 1995). There were several terrorists with ties to Middle Eastern terrorist organizations active in the United States during the period 1980 to 1994.

One of the most well-known state sponsors of terrorism has been Libya. After the Libyan embassy in Washington, D.C. was closed, Libya formed the People's Committee for Students of Libyan Jamahariya in 1981, whose official purpose was to assist Libyan students in the United States. This organization, along with the Manara Travel Agency in Washington, D.C., consisted of Libyan government agents whose purposes were gathering intelligence, conducting assassinations of government officials, and supporting American radical domestic groups. Towards these ends, the group obtained the names of over one thousand federal employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the FBI, and transmitted this information to Libya. Also, the organization funded the travel of many American dissidents and arranged for them to attend meetings in Libya. In 1987, the group organized and funded a demonstration in front of the White House to protest the bombings of Libya by the United States military (Smith, 1994).

The Libyan government also sponsored at least five assassination plots against Libyans residing in the United States who opposed the Kaddafi regime. One attempt involved the use of a contracted former United States special forces soldier. In a similar

instance of what might be considered contracted terrorism, evidence was discovered in 1986 indicating that a Chicago based gang called El Rukn offered to commit terrorist acts for Libya in return for money. When law enforcement officials found letters from Libyan officials indicating that gang members had traveled to Central America to meet with Libyan officials, as well as automatic weapons, hand grenades, and a rocket launcher in the possession of four gang members, they were arrested and charged with conspiring to commit terrorist acts for Libya (Hoffman, 1988).

In July 1988, the key members of the People's Committee for Students of Libyan Jamahariya and the Manara Travel Agency were indicted by a federal court. One member fled the country, six plead guilty and were fined 100,000 dollars each and deported from the country, and a final member was fined 100,000 dollars and sentenced to five years in prison, to be suspended if the fine was paid. Further investigation of the People's Committee for Students of Libyan Jamahariya continued and no significant terrorist activity was credited to Libyan terrorists in the United States since 1988 (Smith, 1994).

The Abu Nidal Organization has received considerable aid from Iraq, Syria, and Libya (Department of State, 1995). Evidence has been discovered that some of their members may have been involved with planing terrorist attacks in the United States. In 1987, a naturalized United States citizen of Palestinian ancestry was being held in the United States facing extradition to Israel where he was accused of taking part in a 1986 bombing of a civilian bus. Based upon the evidence provided by one of the terrorists involved in the attack and upon American intelligence information, the individual mentioned was identified as a covert agent in the United States to recruit members and lay

the foundation for terrorist activity in the United States. In 1993, four members of the Abu Nidal Organization were arrested in Missouri, Wisconsin, and Ohio and were charged with violating Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statutes and conducting terrorist activities (FBI, 1994).

Composed of Muslims who advocated greater Syrian control and involvement in Lebanon, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party has expressed anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiments. In 1987, the results of an investigation revealed that a Lebanese-born naturalized Canadian citizen illegally crossing the border into the United States possessing illegally transported weapons and explosives had been aided by two Lebanese born naturalized Canadians who were members of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.

Although the plans and motives of the individuals were not discovered, the group was suspected to have been receiving orders from some organization outside the United States, possibly Iran (Smith, 1994).

The Mujahedin-E-Khalq (MEK) is another group which has not targeted American interests, but instead has used the United States as a battleground to attack Iranian interests. The group is the largest and most active dissident group opposed to the current regime in Iran, and has declared that only violence can achieve their goals of changing the Iranian government (Department of State, 1994). In 1992, five members of the MEK attacked the Iranian Mission to the United Nations as part of a coordinated attack against 12 Iranian diplomatic missions worldwide. Arrested and charged, the five were sentenced to three months imprisonment in 1993 (FBI, 1994).

In the 1993 edition of Terrorism in the United States, the FBI stated that "the most notable development in 1993 was the emergence of international radical fundamentalism both around the world and inside the United States," (FBI, 1994, p. 26). International radical fundamentalist groups were defined as groups of individuals of various nationalities with the common goal of replacing democratic governments with nonsecular governments. Members of these types of groups were identified as the individuals responsible for two significant terrorist actions in 1993 (FBI, 1994). On February 26, the World Trade Center was bombed resulting in the deaths of six Americans and over one thousand injured. Five international radical fundamentalists were later arrested and charged for their suspected role in the bombing. On June 24, a plot to bomb the United Nations building in New York City, and the Lincoln and Holland tunnels was uncovered when eight members were arrested while constructing bombs (FBI, 1994).

Other international groups.

The Provisional Irish Republican Army is a clandestine terrorist organization whose goals are the removal of British military forces from Northern Ireland and the unification of Ireland (Department of State, 1995). The group was active in the United States during the 1980 to 1994 time period, although they committed no terrorist attacks in America and limited their activities chiefly to fund-raising, weapons procuring, and gaining political support. Investigations conducted by the FBI in 1984 and 1985 uncovered attempts by individuals associated with the Provos to buy weapons and military supplies in the United States and transport them to Ireland. The FBI also discovered that the groups were financing their operations through the drug trade. Between 1986 and

1987, 13 individuals were charged with violating Export Administration Act and RICO statutes as well as drug smuggling and received prison sentences (Smith, 1994).

The Japanese Red Army is a terrorist organization with the stated goals of overthrowing the Japanese government and inciting world revolution. The group was responsible for many terrorist attacks against American interests overseas, including the 1988 bombing of a United Service Men's (USO) club in Naples, Italy to protest the 1986 American raids of Libya (Department of State, 1995). In 1988, a member of the Japanese Red Army was arrested along the New Jersey Turnpike with three bombs in his possession. Investigation revealed that the target was a Navy recruiting center in New York City and that the bombing was to coincide with the bombing of the USO club in Naples, Italy. The individual was subsequently sentenced to thirty years imprisonment (Smith, 1994).

Jewish Terrorism

During the first half of the 1980s, Jewish terrorists were some of the most active within the United States. Jewish terrorist groups sought to call attention to the oppression of Jews within the Soviet Union, to protect the rights of Jews worldwide, and to support Israel (Hoffman, 1988). The most prominent and active organization, the Jewish Defense League, was formed by the Rabbi Meir D. Kahane in 1968 (Smith, 1994). Most of the attacks of the Jewish Defense League targeted Soviet interests in the United States and suspected former Nazis (Hoffman, 1988).

The Jewish Defense League conducted some of the most lethal terrorist attacks in the United States and its members have been considered some of the most proficient. In

1985, the group conducted bombings to assassinate a suspected Nazi war criminal, the West Coast Director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, and attempted to assassinate a former concentration camp guard. In 1986, they released tear gas in the Metropolitan Opera House in New York City just after a Soviet ballet troupe had finished performing (Hoffman, 1988).

Most of the Jewish Defense League's attacks occurred in New York City, where their national headquarters is located. However, affixing responsibility to the group for the acts was difficult. Although the group has been considered a terrorist organization by the FBI, it was also a legally registered political action group. After an attack an anonymous caller would normally claim responsibility for the Jewish Defense League, which would in turn deny the claim and thereby avoid prosecution (Hoffman, 1988).

In 1987, four members were arrested and convicted for their roles in bombings that occurred during 1984 to 1986. These convictions, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and internal power struggles resulting from the fact that Rabbi Kahane severed ties with the organization have led to a weakening of the Jewish Defense League (Hoffman 1988, & Smith, 1994). Since 1986, there have been no acts of terrorism in the United States attributed to Jewish terrorists (FBI, 1994). The Jewish Defense League and the United Jewish Underground, composed mostly of pro-Israeli Jewish-American terrorists, were responsible for 25 acts of terrorism in the United States during the 1980s; 18 of the attacks were committed by the Jewish Defense League, which has conducted some of the most lethal attacks of American terrorists. Increased federal investigations of the Jewish Defense League led to the arrests of four of the leaders of the organization in 1987, and

no acts of terrorism have been attributed to the Jewish Defense League or the United Jewish Underground since that time (Smith, 1994, & FBI, 1994).

Left-Wing Terrorism

According to the FBI, "left-wing groups generally strive to bring about armed revolution in the United States and profess a socialist doctrine," (FBI, 1994, p. 21). The left-wing groups which operated in America during 1980-1994, were essentially recycled versions of leftist organizations which were active in the 1960s and 1970s with the anti-Vietnam War movement and the civil rights movement. Also, many of the leaders of the organizations were also activists in earlier organizations (Hoffman, 1988). Most leftist organizations have had a difficult time recruiting new members, a problem which has become more acute with the apparent demise of communism (Smith, 1994). The only left-wing organizations which committed terrorist acts during 1980-1994 were the M19CO and the UFF. Although the FBI maintains separate statistics for Puerto Rican terrorism, the most active groups of Puerto Rican separatists have been characterized as left-wing. Also, evidence has revealed that there have been links between left-wing terrorist organizations and many of the Puerto Rican terrorist organizations, as well as with Cuba and left-wing organizations in foreign countries (Smith, 1994).

The May 19th Communist Organization

As discussed in the previous chapter, the members of the M19CO represented a virtual who's who list of American left wing extremists. The organization's plan of attack included three objectives, the first of which involved liberating other left-wing extremist who were serving prison sentences. The next objective was the acquisition of the financial

resources to fund their operations. The final objective involved the use of bombings and attacks to foment revolution among the masses to bring about the type of Marxist society they hoped would evolve (Smith, 1994).

Concerning their first objective, the group was successful in bringing about the escape of the leader of the Black Liberation Army from prison in 1979. During the same year the group successfully helped the leader of the FALN, escape from Bellevue Hospital. With the assistance of the M19CO, both fugitives were successful in fleeing to Cuba (Smith, 1994).

After having achieved their first objective, the group embarked upon a campaign of armed robbery to fund their third objective. On October 20, 1981, the group robbed a Brinks armored car in Nyack, New York. After a shoot-out with the police and a subsequent car chase, four members of the M19CO group were arrested. During the investigation of the Brinks robbery, the authorities learned of the M19CO's role in the escapes of the captive left wing leaders mentioned above. In a shoot out with police three days later, another group member was arrested and one was killed (Smith, 1994).

The remaining members of the M19CO began working towards their third objective in 1983 when the group bombed the federal building on Staten Island, New York. From 1983 to 1985, the group was responsible for at least eight separate bombings, including the November 7, 1983, bombing of the United States Capitol building (Hoffman, 1988). Their targets were primarily federal and military buildings and included the National War College at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., the Washington Navy Computing Center, the Israeli Aircraft Industries Building in New York City, the

Washington Navy Yard Officers' Club, and the South African Consulate in New York City in addition to those mentioned above (Smith, 1994).

Beginning with the four individuals arrested after the Brinks robbery, prosecutions of different members of the M19CO continued until 1990. By the end of the 1980s, almost the entire leadership of the M19CO had been imprisoned, killed, or had fled the country. The last terrorist attack attributed to the group was the 1985 bombing of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association in New York City (Smith, 1994).

United Freedom Front.

The UFF was the most active left-wing terrorist group in the United States from 1975 to 1985, with the exception of the Puerto Rican separatists. During that time, the group conducted a total of 20 bombings of corporate and government buildings and nine armed bank robberies along the east coast of the United States. Never composed of more than eight members, the UFF was highly successful at evading the authorities. With the arrests of group members in 1984 and 1985, the UFF was effectively disbanded as members were brought to trial. By 1989, all the members of the organization were behind bars serving lengthy prison sentences (Smith, 1994).

Puerto Rican terrorism.

The Puerto Rican terrorist groups have claimed to be fighting for the independence of Puerto Rico from the oppressive domination of the United States. The members have sought the separation of Puerto Rico from the United States and the establishment of a socialist-communist state. Although many of these groups exist, the vast majority of terrorist acts have been committed by six major groups, only one of which is based outside

Puerto Rico. Close ties have existed between these various groups and some have conducted joint attacks. Some of the groups have also maintained close ties with Cuba. Puerto Rican terrorist groups have completed more than half of the successful terrorist attacks in the United States during the past 30 years, and have been the most active group of terrorists in America (Smith, 1994).

The one group based outside Puerto Rico, the FALN, emerged in 1974 and was responsible for over one hundred bombings over the following six years, mostly in New York and Chicago (Hoffman, 1988). The group's targets included government buildings, military installations, and commercial businesses. The leader of FALN, William Morales, was arrested in 1977. Two years later the M19CO helped him escape to Mexico where he continued to run operations until 1983 when he fled to Cuba. From 1980 to 1985, most of the key FALN members were arrested and imprisoned and no more terrorist attacks were conducted by FALN (Smith, 1994).

The five other main groups have based their operations in Puerto Rico and include the Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP), the Ejercito Popular Boricua-Macheteros, the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP), the Guerrilla Forces of Liberation (GFL), and the Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces (PACRF). The Macheteros, FARP, and OVRP became active in 1978, while the GRF and the PACRF did not become active until the late 1980s. These groups accounted for the majority of all terrorist attacks conducted in Puerto Rico (Smith, 1994).

The two newer groups, the GRF and the PACRF, opted to attack non-military targets. They have bombed banks, government buildings, and commercial businesses.

The other three groups have largely selected military personnel and installations as the targets of their attacks. By selecting military targets, these groups have attempted to portray themselves as soldiers in a war of liberation. They have equated the presence of the United States military in Puerto Rico as an army of occupation and an oppressive colonial force intent upon ensuring the exploitation of Puerto Rico by the United States. These three groups have often worked together to carry out joint attacks (Smith, 1994). Of all the Puerto Rican terrorist organizations, the Macheteros and the OVRP have conducted the most attacks, and have conducted the most daring and violent attacks. One of the most spectacular terrorist attacks in American history was committed by the Macheteros in 1981, when they destroyed nine military aircraft and caused over 40 million dollars worth of damage at the Muniz Air National Guard Base in Puerto Rico. In addition to bombings, they have conducted assassinations of American military personnel as well (Hoffman, 1988).

Prosecuting Puerto Rican separatists in Puerto Rico has proven difficult as juries there have not returned many convictions. However, when members of the Macheteros planned and conducted an armed robbery of a Wells Fargo depot in West Hartford, Connecticut in 1983, federal prosecutors were able move their trial outside Puerto Rico and convict four members who received prison sentences. Although several Puerto Rican terrorists have been arrested and imprisoned, the authorities have not had the successes they have enjoyed with other left-wing groups (Smith, 1994). Indeed, Puerto Rican terrorism continued until 1993, which marked the first year in the history of the FBI's

counterterrorism program during which there were no terrorist acts attributed to Puerto Rican terrorists (FBI, 1994).

There have been no terrorist attacks yet attributed to Puerto Rican terrorists since 1992. While the FBI stated they were uncertain as to the reasons for the cessation of the terrorism, they partly attributed the lull to the political plebiscite which was held on the island in November, 1993. During the plebiscite, the residents of Puerto Rico were provided the opportunity to vote on the political status of the island. The residents could vote for a continuance of the commonwealth status, independence, or for statehood as a state of the United States of America. The voters elected to maintain Puerto Rico's status as a commonwealth of the United States, in effect maintaining the status quo. The terrorist organizations may have halted their attacks until the outcome of the plebiscite was announced (FBI, 1994). Since there was in effect no change made, the motivation for continued terrorist activity remains.

Right-Wing Terrorism

The 1980s saw the emergence of white supremacist and right wing extremist groups organized as paramilitary survivalist organizations which openly preached sedition and the use of violence (Hoffman, 1988). Linking these groups is their shared commitment, in varying degrees, to the Christian Identity Movement. The basic tenets of the ideology assert that Jesus Christ was an Aryan, that the white Anglo Saxons are the chosen people of God, and that the United States is the Promised Land (Hoffman, 1988). Believers contend that Jews and other non white races have conspired to control governments, the economy, and the media; as impostors and the children of Satan, the

Jews and other non white races must be eliminated. The groups have called for the overthrow of the United States government which they frequently refer to as the Zionist Occupation Government, or ZOG, and they have refused to recognize any governments above county level (Smith, 1994). As a result, many such groups have opposed income taxes and have at times refused to pay. With the Christian Identity movement as the ideological base, these groups also have similar goals of racial and religious purification of the United States, and many have called for the creation of a whites only independent nation in the Pacific Northwest of the United States (Smith, 1994).

To be prepared for the eventual race war which will occur when the chosen people unite, these groups have created survivalist camps to teach weapons skills, guerrilla warfare, and outdoor survival skills. These groups have a significant percentage of military and law enforcement personnel among their membership, and many of these individuals serve as instructors at the various survival schools. As a result, most of the right wing terrorists are better trained and more skilled with weapons, explosives, and guerrilla warfare techniques than most of the other terrorists in America (Hoffman, 1988).

Some may question the date of the beginnings of right-wing terrorist since organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan have used politically motivated violence since the end of the American Civil War. Yet official FBI statistics have only recently reflected many of the acts of such hate groups as acts of terrorism (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). There were few official acts of terrorism attributed to right-wing terrorists due in large part to the timing of events. Many right-wing organizations began to turn to the use of terrorism in the early 1980s, during the same time that the FBI increased its counterterrorism efforts

to deal with other terrorist groups. Consequently, many leaders of right-wing organizations were arrested for crimes committed during their preparation for terrorism; 75 right-wing extremists were prosecuted during the 1980s yet their organizations were credited with only six terrorist incidents. The 1990s, however, have seen a resurgence of right-wing terrorism (Smith, 1994).

Sheriff's Posse Comitatus.

Formed in Portland, Oregon in 1969 by Henry Beach and William Gale, the Sheriff's Posse Comitatus (SPC) quickly spread as chapters were eventually formed in almost every state. Gale was a retired United States Army colonel who had served on General MacArthur's staff during World War II; his membership in this organization was indicative of the membership in such organizations by individuals associated with the military (Hoffman, 1988). The organization initially gained popularity by providing advice on evading taxes and protecting personal property. Some members of the SPC also belonged to the Aryan Nations and other right wing groups, and Gale was the individual who introduced Wesley Swift, then the leader of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, and Richard Butler, later Swift's successor as the leader of the Church and creator of the Aryan Nations (Smith, 1994).

One of the members, Gordon Kahl, was arrested in 1977 for refusing to pay his taxes and sentenced to probation. When he refused to report to his probation officer in 1983, federal agents attempted to arrest him again. During the shoot-out which ensued, Kahl killed two United States marshals and wounded three more before escaping. Kahl made his way to the home of a member of the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the

Lord (CSA) in Arkansas (Smith, 1994). On June 3, 1983, federal authorities caught up with Kahl and another gun battle ensued during which Kahl was killed. The death of Kahl made him a martyr to the other right wing terrorist groups and this event provided the spark which ignited the outburst of violence conducted by The Order, the CSA, and the White Patriot Party (Smith, 1994).

After Kahl's death, several members of the SPC began to stockpile arms to prepare for further action against the federal government. In 1984, the FBI, which was closely monitoring the group, raided many of their residences and confiscated weapons which led to many weapons violations convictions of members before they could conduct terrorist activities. Then in 1985, many of the groups leaders were arrested when they attempted to create their own township in Tigerton Dells, Wisconsin (Smith, 1994).

On August 20, 1986, the SPC sent a package bomb to the Fargo, North Dakota residence of U.S. Federal District Judge Paul Benson, who had presided over the trials of several members of the SPC, including Gordon Kahl. Another package had exploded a couple of days earlier in a local post office. Also in 1986, a husband and wife team who were SPC members took an elementary school hostage in Cokeville, Wyoming. Both individuals were killed when the bomb they were using accidentally exploded; 70 school children were also injured in the blast (Hoffman, 1988).

Arizona Patriots.

An off-shoot of the SPC, the Arizona Patriots organization was created in 1982 by Ty Hardin as an anti-tax group. Members of the group were also anti-Communist and prepared to defend themselves when the communist invasion from Mexico occurred. In

1984, the group announced an indictment of all government officials in Arizona and called for their resignations. After the announcement, the FBI began an intensive investigation of the organization (Smith, 1994).

Some of the more extreme members of the Arizona Patriots thought the organization should turn to violence and continue the work of the Order and the CSA. Jack Oliphant and Foster Hoover established a camp about twenty miles outside Kingman, Arizona, and began to discuss their plans to create a paramilitary training camp and to begin a campaign of terror. However, the group was infiltrated at times by as many as three FBI agents. In mid 1985, members of the group made plans to bomb a Jewish synagogue, bomb the Internal Revenue Service Regional Complex at Ogden, Utah, and to bomb several hydroelectric plants along the Colorado River. To fund these operations, the group planned to rob an armored car carrying money from the casinos in Las Vegas. Aware of the Arizona Patriots' plans from the beginning, the FBI moved in December 1986, and arrested many of the group's members before any of the plans could be executed. Oliphant and four others pled guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery and weapons violations and were imprisoned. Hoover pled guilty to weapons violations and received five years probation (Smith, 1994).

Since the convictions of Oliphant and Hoover in 1987, no terrorist activity has been attributed to the Arizona Patriots (FBI, 1994). However, evidence was found to indicate that the suspected bomber of the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, may have had connections to the Arizona Patriots. Timothy McVeigh, the suspected bomber, lived in a trailer park in Kingman, Arizona for five months in 1994. During the time he

was there, a small bomb exploded in a residential area of Kingman. The Arizona Patriots have been known to conduct explosives training in areas around Kingman. Evidence has indicated that McVeigh had expressed anti-government feelings in the past (Gleick, 1995). Although not proven, there may be a link between the Oklahoma City bombing and the Arizona Patriots, and/or perhaps other right wing extremist groups.

The Aryan Nations.

Richard Butler was proclaimed the leader of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, a Christian Identity Movement off shoot, in the early 1970s. In 1974, he established a secular arm of the church called the Aryan Nations, which has served as a link between the various right wing extremist organizations. One of the stated aims of the Aryan Nations has been to strengthen the ties among the members of the various groups, and towards this end the organization has held annual Aryan Nations Congresses at the Hayden Lake site (Smith, 1994). The congresses have brought together the representatives of various white supremacist, survivalist, anti-federalist, and racist organizations from throughout the United States and Canada, and some splinter groups such as The Order have been created during the sessions. Although the Aryan Nations has not had any terrorist acts attributed to the organization, many of its members have been indicted and convicted for terrorist activity. Most significant however is that these right wing extremist groups have members and supporters from all over the country, and in Canada, and members of different groups have aided one another on several occasions. The group also recruits members in American prisons through the efforts of its prison organization, the Aryan Brotherhood. Such organization tends to provide evidence for the potential existence of a national

network of right wing extremists and terrorists (Hoffman, 1988). As evidence of such a national network, imprisoned leader of the CSA became an informant and testified that he, Butler, The Order's leader Robert Mathews, and others met during the 1983 Aryan Nations Congress and devised plans to foment revolution. The plans called for The Order to conduct a national campaign of terror and for the CSA to become the main source of weapons and equipment for the campaign (Smith, 1994).

The Order.

The founder of The Order, Richard Matthews, was heavily influenced by a book called The Turner Diaries, which told the story of a resistance movement called "The Order" which emerged to fight the Jews and the blacks who controlled the United States. Matthews took the name for his group from the book and also used the novel as a blueprint for conducting terrorist operations. Matthews was present at the 1983 Aryan Nations Congress and recruited the members for his organization from among the attendees, including Gary Yarborough who was the chief of security for the Aryan Nations (Smith, 1994).

To gain the resources necessary to conduct the campaign of terror, The Order conducted a series of armed robberies of banks and armored cars. The most spectacular were the 1984 robberies of a Continental Armored Transport Service armored car in Seattle, Washington, and a Brinks armored car in Ukiah, California. During the robbery in Seattle, a pornographic movie theater was bombed as a diversion as the group robbed the armored car of 534,000 dollars. During the Brinks robbery, the group took 3.6 million dollars (Smith, 1994). Both robberies were characterized by the use of automatic

weapons, detailed reconnaissance, and well-planned and executed ambushes (Hoffman, 1988). The Order also conducted a counterfeiting operation using printing equipment located at the Aryan Nations compound. Matthews used the stolen money to fund his army, and he also distributed funds to other organizations such as the White Patriot Party (Smith, 1994).

The Order's campaign of terror began in 1984 with the burning of a Jewish synagogue in Boise, Idaho. During the same year, members of the group executed one of their members who they believed talked too much, and assassinated Alan Berg. A Jewish host of a radio talk show in Denver, Colorado, Berg had continuously criticized the Christian Identity beliefs and the groups associate with them. Members of the order machine-gunned Berg to death outside his home in Denver (Smith, 1994).

In late 1984, the FBI began to close in on The Order. Through investigation and information provided by an informant, the FBI was able to find and arrest most of the group's members. Matthews, however, died in a shoot-out with federal agents during a siege of his hideout near the Puget Sound in Washington on December 8, 1984. During 1985, at least 28 people associated with The Order were convicted for crimes associated with the group's activities. Charges included weapons violations, counterfeiting, possession of explosives, violations of RICO statutes, and civil rights violations. After the death of the group's leader and the convictions of so many members, the group effectively ceased operations. However, many of those in prison continue to operate with the Aryan Brotherhood, and there has remained some support on the outside as well (Smith, 1994).

The Order II.

After The Order was effectively stopped, a group of Aryan Nations members led by the husband and wife team of David and Deborah Door created The Order II. Like The Order before them, the group conducted counterfeiting operations to help fund their activities. Their first attempt at terrorism occurred in 1986, with the unsuccessful bombing of the residence of a local Jewish businessman. They next successfully bombed a local business in Kootenai County, Idaho. A little later, two members executed a third member they suspected of being an informant. After the Doors defended their beliefs on the Oprah Winfrey Show, the group firebombed the residence of William Wassmuth, a Roman Catholic priest and outspoken critic of the Aryan Nations. Finally, on September 29, 1986, the five members of the group were arrested after having exploded four bombs in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, as a diversion for the robbery of a bank and a Idaho National Guard armory. After being arrested, one of the members agreed to testify against the others and was placed in the Federal Witness Protection Program. With the testimony, other members pled guilty to charges of murder and violations of RICO statutes and were incarcerated. The Order II collapsed and has not been heard from again (Smith, 1994).

The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord.

James Ellison, another Christian Identity proponent, created the CSA in Marion County, Arkansas in 1975. In 1977, Kerry Noble and Randal Rader were made "elders" by Ellison and they began to militarize the group. Rader began conducting military training for CSA members and set up a training school for other Christian Identity group

members. In 1982, Aryan Nations leader Richard Butler visited the CSA compound on a recruiting trip and ties between the two organizations were solidified. Soon thereafter, Rader and some other members left the CSA, only to turn up later as members of The Order. After Gordon Kahl was killed in 1983, Butler asked Ellison to attend the 1983 Aryan Nations Congress. Ellison later testified that secret meetings were held at this Congress during which it was decided by the leaders of the Aryan Nations, The Order, and the CSA that the CSA would be an arms depot and training camp for the terrorists during the planned campaign of terror (Smith, 1994).

After the 1983 Aryan Nations Congress, the CSA began its work towards the campaign of terror. During August 1983, the members burned a church in Springfield, Missouri, which had supported gay rights, and the Jewish Community Center in Bloomingdale, Indiana. In November of 1983, members of the CSA detonated a bomb along a natural gas pipeline near Fulton, Arkansas causing minor damage. Members of the group also robbed a pawn shop in Texarkana and killed the Jewish owner. In December of the same year, Ellison was the first of the right wing extremists to declare war against the ZOG and created the "War in '84" motto used by many of the groups (Smith, 1994).

When FBI agents broke up The Order and killed Matthews in 1984, several members of The Order fled to the CSA compound in Arkansas. By April 1985, the FBI had discovered the links between the Aryan Nations, The Order, and the CSA and laid siege to the CSA compound. After three days, Ellison and his followers surrendered to the FBI on April 22, 1985. Ellison and others pled guilty to weapons violations and were incarcerated. Other members were convicted for supplying weapons to members of The

Order. Additional convictions were passed down for the bombing of the pipeline, the burning of the church and Jewish center, interstate transportation of stolen vehicles, and other weapons violations (Smith, 1994).

White Patriot Party.

Frazier Miller, a Neo-Nazi and former member of the United States Army special forces, created the Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in 1980, in North Carolina (Hoffman, 1988). Miller began an association with Robert Matthews, the leader of The Order. In April 1984, Matthews sent two members of The Order to visit Miller in North Carolina. These visitors provided Miller with a 1,000 dollar contribution, most likely from funds gained through robbery, and the Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux Klan became drawn into the plans for the coming campaign of terror (Smith, 1994).

During the summer of 1984, Miller and his group began to stockpile weapons. Miller and four other members met with Robert Jones, an individual who had many contacts among United States Army personnel at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Jones was to arrange the theft of weapons and equipment from the United States Army and to conduct military training for the Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. After the demise of The Order in 1985, Miller changed the name of his group to the White Patriot Party (WPP) (Smith, 1994).

With 300,000 dollars in funds donated by The Order, Miller's group began to use their compound to provide paramilitary training for other Christian Identity groups. The instructors at his camp included many active duty military personnel who had been hired by Jones. The director of The Southern Poverty Law Center, Morris Dees, filed a lawsuit

to force the Department of Defense to investigate the involvement of the military with the WPP. Miller was subsequently ordered by a federal court judge in North Carolina to stop the paramilitary training (Smith, 1994).

During 1986 and 1987, Miller and most of the key members of the WPP were arrested. Members of the group were charged with violating the court order by continuing the paramilitary training, weapons violations, and mailing threatening communications which indicated Miller had desired to assassinate Morris Dees. Miller pled guilty to various charges in 1988, and was sentenced to five years in prison with five additional years probation. Soon thereafter, the WPP disbanded (Smith, 1994).

Skinheads movement.

Characterized by religious and racial bigotry, hatred of foreigners, and close association with Nazism, members of skinhead gangs have been arrested for many different violent crimes against Jews, blacks, and other minorities. Because of their ideological kinship with the Christian Identity groups, the skinheads have been a target for recruitment by such organizations as the Aryan Nations. Skinheads were represented at both the 1986 and 1987 Aryan Nations Congresses (Hoffman, 1988).

In 1993, two terrorist acts were attributed to a group known as the American Skinhead Front by the FBI. Members of the group bombed a National Association for the Advancement of Colored People headquarters in Tacoma, Washington, and a homosexual bar in Seattle, Washington in July 1993. Upon the arrest of two of the members and interrogation by the FBI, it was discovered that the American Front Skinheads had bombed the establishments in an attempt to initiate a race war (FBI, 1994).

Single-Issue Terrorism

Another grouping of terrorists is what the FBI refers to as special interest terrorist groups, which focus their efforts on a specific cause and the resolution of a specific issue. Environmental, anti-nuclear, and animal rights groups have been active in the United States for a couple of decades, but in the late eighties extremist elements of these groups began to attract the attention of federal authorities. Violent acts committed by some of these groups were labeled as terrorism by the FBI starting in 1987 (Smith, 1994).

Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy.

David Foreman, the informal leader of the environmental movement called Earth First created in 1980, created the EMETIC with other radical environmental extremists in 1987, in Arizona. Desiring to protect the environment from abuses and exploitation from humans, the group violently opposed the use of nuclear power in the United States. Their terrorist activity began in November 1987, when they sabotaged the ski lift at the Fairfield Snow Bowl ski resort causing over 20,000 dollars in damage. They next destroyed 34 power poles supporting power lines used by uranium mines near the Grand Canyon in 1988. Also during the same year, the group again sabotaged the ski lift at the Fairfield Snow Bowl by toppling a supporting pole (Smith, 1994).

On May 30, 1989 three members were arrested as they attempted to sabotage a electrical substation in Wenden, Arizona. Further investigation by the FBI revealed that the incident at Wenden was a practice run for plans to sabotage power transmission lines at three separate nuclear facilities in California, Arizona, and Colorado. The rest of the group, including Foreman, were quickly arrested and brought to trial on charges of

conspiracy as well as other lesser charges. Sentences were relatively light, and sentencing of Foreman was delayed until 1996, at which time he will be allowed to enter a guilty plea to a misdemeanor charge if he does not violate the conditions of his parole (Smith, 1994).

Animal Liberation Front.

The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) has claimed responsibility for over one hundred crimes throughout the United States and in foreign countries. These crimes have included vandalism and arson of animal laboratories, theft of lab equipment and animals, and destruction of laboratory records and research data. Justification for their actions apparently springs from a belief that humans have been causing other species to suffer as they exploit animals in efforts to improve the quality of human life. As with the EMETIC, the activities were not classified as terrorism by the FBI until the late eighties. In 1987, members of the ALF claimed responsibility for setting fire to the Veterinary Medicine Research Building at the University of California-Davis which caused over 3.5 million dollars damage. In 1989, the group released over one thousand laboratory animals from the University of Arizona, then set fire to two buildings on the campus. Later during the same year, the group broke into the Health Sciences Center at the Texas Technical University and released laboratory animals, destroyed equipment, stole research and data, and vandalized the laboratory (Smith, 1994). In 1993, the group claimed responsibility for placing nine incendiary devices in four Chicago department stores presumably to protest the fur trade. The devices were intended cause fires upon detonation which in turn would activate the sprinkler system. Four of the devices were successful. To date, there have

been no significant arrests of ALF members and little is known about the organization (FBI, 1994).

Chapter Four: United States Programs for Combating Terrorism and Prospects for the Future

The potential for terrorist attacks against targets within the United States poses a significant threat to governmental agencies charged with maintaining order and protecting the populace. In order to be prepared to cope with the threat, these agencies must have a strategy for dealing with the threat of terrorism and the resources to combat the threat. An effective program for combating terrorism must incorporate two elements, antiterrorism programs and counterterrorism programs. Antiterrorism refers to those defensive and preventive measures implemented to reduce the chance of a terrorist attack, while counterterrorism refers to those offensive measures implemented immediately following a terrorist attack (Tompkins, 1984). Antiterrorism involves the prevention, deterrence, and prediction of terrorist attacks, while counterterrorism involves the reaction to terrorist attacks (Seger, 1990).

Antiterrorism

Although both elements are essential to countering terrorism, antiterrorism is more important as it seeks to combat terrorism before the attack is executed. Ideally, if the antiterrorism program is 100% effective, there is no need for counterterrorism. Although we do not live in an ideal world, creating an effective antiterrorism program is still very important given the potential for the continued use of terrorism, the trends of increasing

terrorist lethality, and the potential for acts of super terrorism.. Two elements which are critical to an effective antiterrorism program are the coordination of intelligence services and the communication of timely and accurate intelligence, and the existence of an effective overall command and control structure (Hoffman & Taw, 1992).

Intelligence is the key to an effective antiterrorism program. The success of an antiterrorism program will depend not only upon the quantity and quality of information gathered, but also upon its accurate analysis, and perhaps most important, its timely dissemination to all antiterrorism efforts (Hoffman & Taw, 1992). Intelligence drives the assessment of potential terrorist threats, which in turn drives the preparations taken to prevent, deter, or interdict the threat. By the effective use of intelligence, FBI agents were able to foil a plot in 1993 by Islamic fundamentalists to bomb the United Nations building, and the Lincoln and Holland tunnels in New York City (FBI, 1994). Antiterrorism programs must have dynamic information to enable an increase or decrease of defensive systems as the threats change. There are not enough resources to protect all prospective targets, and no target can be assured of 100% immunity from terrorism. But by using intelligence to help predict the sites of future terrorist activity, security at the potential targets may be increased and thereby cause terrorists to perceive that an attack on the targets would be too costly (Tompkins, 1984). Lieutenant Colonel Sir Julian Paget, a British counterinsurgency and counterterrorism expert, lists six principles on which any successful campaign against terrorism must be based:

1. An effective intelligence gathering organization should be established *before* the insurgency begins.

2. Every effort must be made to know the Enemy before the insurgency begins.
 3. The intelligence organization should be fully integrated, under one chief of intelligence.
 4. Intelligence must be worked for and not waited for, and its acquisition should be made a top priority for the security forces.
 5. The cooperation of the populace, though not essential to the gaining of intelligence, is a tremendous asset, and every effort must be made to gain this support.
 6. The best intelligence comes from penetrating the insurgent organizations.
- (Hoffman & Taw, 1992, p. 77)

Prior to the eruption of terrorist violence, an effective command and control structure should be in place and functioning to detect and respond to the first indications of a terrorist threat. Without such a structure, the terrorists are able to gain the initiative due to surprise. Also, the lack of a command and control will most likely lead to confusion among the various federal, state, and local agencies responsible for combating the threat, which could lead to duplication of effort, competition, and poor intelligence flow (Hoffman & Taw, 1992).

In regards to combating terrorism, the United States has established the foundation for an effective program. Appointed as the lead agency for combating terrorism in the United States, the FBI is responsible for coordinating the federal response to terrorist incidents (FBI, 1994). The FBI is charged both with identifying and preventing terrorist acts before they occur, and with implementing an immediate investigative response once

an act of terrorism takes place (FBI, 1994). As the lead agency, the FBI serves as the focal point for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information on terrorist activity and also serves as the central command and control agency for terrorism. While the FBI has performed admirably in this role, especially in regards to their reactions to terrorist incidents, there exist some problems. Terrorism is a crime and much like the crime-fighting methods of the American policing system, the American response to terrorism has been more effective than the prevention of terrorism. The FBI maintains an extensive computer database known as the Terrorist Information System which contains intelligence information on suspected terrorist groups and individuals (Center for National Security Studies, 1995). However, many other federal agencies gather and process their own information concerning terrorist activity, and there is no consolidated central federal agency that collects and analyzes all the intelligence information for all the agencies involved in antiterrorist activities (Simon, 1990). In addition to the FBI database, the Department of State, the Department of Defense and each of its subdivisions, the Central Intelligence Agency, and others all maintain their own distinct intelligence operations regarding terrorism (Seger, 1990). Although the various agencies do at times cooperate, there is no central oversight of intelligence information regarding terrorism to analyze all the information in its entirety, to reduce duplication of effort, and to coordinate antiterrorist efforts (Simon, 1990).

An important task of the antiterrorist program is to identify potential terrorist groups and predict terrorist attacks in an attempt to prevent them. Once an attack has occurred, the FBI has proven effective at subsequently investigating and interdicting

terrorist organizations. They have also enjoyed some success at preventing many terrorist attacks, yet between 1980 and 1994, 247 terrorist attacks occurred (Smith, 1994, and FBI, 1994). Once a group or individual had been identified as terrorist, the FBI was effective at combating them. However, the FBI was not as successful at initially recognizing the point at which an organization made the move to terrorism and decided to engage in violence. "Outbreaks of terrorist activity are frequently preceded by increases in demonstrations and minor criminal incidents associated with a political or social movement," (Smith, 1994, p. 200). The left wing terrorists grew out of the student demonstrations and racial unrest of the sixties and the FBI failed to predict the point at which these groups turned to violence in the seventies and eighties. Similarly, the growth of the white supremacist and Christian Identity movements and the emergence of right wing paramilitary survivalist camps led to right wing terrorism (Smith, 1994).

As previously discussed, the FBI's ability to collect intelligence information was severely limited after the Senate Watergate hearings in 1973 revealed extensive misconduct concerning the FBI's domestic intelligence operations conducted during the 1940s through the 1960s. In the aftermath of the Senate findings, domestic security investigations conducted by the FBI dramatically decreased from 20, 000 in 1973 to 300 in 1976. The adoption of the Levi Guidelines in 1976 established strict standards under which security investigations could be initiated and specified the length of such investigations (Smith, 1994).

However, by the early 1980s, the increase in terrorism and the election of Ronald Reagan as President focused increased attention on the problem of terrorism. More

resources were devoted to combating terrorism, the FBI was made the lead agency for combating terrorism, and the FBI's program for combating terrorism was elevated from a priority three program to a priority one program, the highest priority (Smith, 1995). In addition, Attorney General William French Smith issued new guidelines for investigating terrorism called the Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations, or the Smith Guidelines for short, which relaxed the Levi Guidelines. These new guidelines, under which the FBI operates today, provide the FBI with extensive antiterrorism capabilities. First, an investigation of a terrorist group may be initiated prior to the actual commitment of a terrorist act. These investigations may remain open even if the group has not committed a recent violent act and even if there is no threat of immediate harm, as long as the goals and prior history of the group warrant continued federal attention. Second, the FBI may initiate an investigation whenever there is reasonable indication that two or more persons are involved in activities to further political or social goals which involve force or violence and criminal conduct. However, acts by single individuals and acts by non-violent dissident groups would not support the initiation of a terrorism investigation. Third, the FBI may initiate a preliminary ninety-day inquiry whenever it receives information which requires further scrutiny; approval must be received from headquarters to extend a preliminary inquiry (Center for National Security Studies, 1995). With the new guidelines and elevation of the program for combating terrorism, the FBI was effective in neutralizing many of the terrorist threats as discussed in the previous chapter.

However at the state and local level, many cities still prohibit law enforcement agencies from investigating suspected or potential terrorist organizations solely on the basis of the group's political or social motivations. Many such prohibitions were created after the Watergate fallout and have continued to exist (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Such prohibitions make intelligence gathering of information concerning potential terrorist attacks more difficult. With efficient communication, law enforcement agencies may inform the FBI of the existence of such a threat and the FBI would be empowered to investigate since they were given the authority and responsibility for investigating terrorism. A side effect of such prohibitions, however, has been to force some police agencies to place greater emphasis on tactical responses to terrorist incidents than on the strategic planning and intelligence operations best suited for preventing terrorist action (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).

Another problem faced by some state and local law enforcement agencies may be poor communication with the FBI. During a research project sponsored by the Rand Corporation from 1991 to 1993, state and local law enforcement agencies were asked to indicate the number of terrorist incidents which had taken place within their jurisdiction. Although provided with the FBI's definition of terrorism, the number of incidents reported by the respondents was significantly larger than the number of terrorist incidents reported by the FBI during the same time period (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). One possible explanation for the over-reporting involves the fact that the FBI is responsible for deciding which incidents are labeled as terrorism. Incidents may be reported to the FBI which under further investigation are revealed to not meet the criteria of terrorism. However,

poor communication between federal, state, and local agencies may have been responsible for some of the over-reporting during the survey (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Some local law enforcement agencies may have lacked the resources and motivation to become familiar with terrorism and may therefore not have known to report terrorist incidents to the FBI.

The level of preparedness of state and local law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism seemed to vary significantly. Although 31 of the 39 state agencies surveyed reported the existence of a terrorist threat in their jurisdiction, only 15 possessed contingency plans for dealing with terrorism. Of the 148 city and county agencies surveyed, 77 possessed contingency plans. A surprising fact was the finding that of the local law enforcement agencies in whose jurisdiction was located a nuclear power plant, only 13 of 26 possessed contingency plans for dealing with terrorism. Of the agencies that possessed contingency plans, 43% of the state plans and 26% of the county plans were reviewed by the FBI; 42 % of the state and 26% of the local plans were not reviewed by any external agency although many of the plans were intended to be used by other local, state, and federal agencies. Similarly, only 8 of 39 state agencies and 30 of 148 local agencies reported possessing guidelines for investigating terrorism (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).

Another communication problem was that 59 of 148 local agencies reported never having contact with federal authorities concerning issues involving terrorism. Federal authorities indicated that although federal review and liaison services were made available, many local agencies failed to request or utilize them (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Such a

lack of coordination may lead to the development of a Green Door syndrome, where the first agency blames the second for not sharing information and the second agency blames the first for not indicating a need for information (Tompkins, 1984).

Of the agencies which indicated they possessed special terrorism units, most indicated their units were tactical as opposed to strategic planning or intelligence which indicated emphasis on counterterrorism as opposed to antiterrorism (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Without an intelligence or strategic planning operation, an agency's ability to proactively combat potential terrorist threats is limited. Many department officials noted this deficiency as a significant weakness (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). One county sheriff also stated that his agency did not possess the resources to maintain an intelligence unit to collect and analyze information, but he indicated that the state and federal agencies possessed such resources and could be used to meet the needs of his department (Sellers, 1995).

Research indicated that although the federal program may have possessed some problems, the FBI has created an extensive and effective antiterrorism program. Due in part to budgetary constraints, resources limitations, and/or poor coordination, many state and local law enforcement agencies do not possess antiterrorism programs. However, several state and local agencies were noted as possessing excellent programs closely coordinated with the FBI (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Although not all agencies possess enough resources, or do not perceive a threat, there is a need for closer coordination and more communication among the many agencies which indicated the existence of a potential terrorist threat.

It is of interest to note that the Rand Corporation survey was conducted prior to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. It is likely that many police agencies re-examined their ability to combat terrorism after this event, and after the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. During the course of this project, contact was made with four South Carolina law enforcement agencies: the State Law Enforcement Division, the Columbia Police Department, the Charleston Police Department, and the Aiken County Sheriff's Office. All agencies reported frequent communication with the FBI and with other federal agencies concerning terrorism issues. The representatives of the Columbia Police Department and the State Law Enforcement Division, located in Columbia, stated that their agencies communicated frequently with the FBI concerning terrorism issues (Clark, 1995, & Anders, 1995). They reported sending information up to the FBI and also receiving down-channeled information from the FBI as well as other federal agencies in a timely manner. They indicated the existence of joint planning meetings and conferences concerning terrorist issues. The Charleston Police Department representative likewise indicated both sending and receiving information to and from the FBI and other federal agencies. However, he also stated that there exists no mechanism to ensure that the FBI and other federal agencies provide the local law enforcement authorities with enough of the information they need to effectively cooperate as a joint effort with the agencies. Interestingly, he stated that he received more cooperation concerning information exchange from the Israeli police and intelligence units accompanying the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra on their visit to Charleston than he received from American agencies of the federal government (Wiley, 1995). Sheriff Sellers

also mentioned that there was no formal communication channel for terrorist information, but that other communications channels existed between his office and the FBI for such information (1995). He further stated that much of the communication flow concerning terrorism was one way up to the FBI, but that in most instances there was no need for the local agency to obtain feedback if the information did not pertain to matters in their area (Sellers, 1995). Such sentiments may indicate the existence of communication problems between the players involved in the efforts to combat terrorism. Likewise, the amount of different information sources may demonstrate a lack of a central, federal intelligence entity to provide oversight of the numerous different federal intelligence organizations. Lieutenant Anders indicated that one of the problems with counterterrorist programs arises from the large number of different agencies which may be investigating an incident at the same time. He used the 1996 Olympic Games as an example of the communications problems which may result when so many different agencies become involved in an operation (1995).

In addition to the use of intelligence, antiterrorism programs may involve other measures taken to reduce the likelihood of experiencing a terrorist attack. Some of these measures include increasing physical security measures at important buildings, airports, and military installations (Seeger, 1990). Other measures involve the enactment of legislation designed to provide greater powers for detecting and prosecuting terrorists and to build public trust and support (Hoffman & Taw, 1992). The former measures tend to be costly, cannot be placed at all potential targets, and are not impenetrable. The latter measures often adversely affect the civil rights of the citizens of the nation. Such

measures should not be enacted unless warranted, and the implementation of such measures should be dynamic and driven by the perceived threat. Therefore, it is essential to possess effective intelligence and command and control systems.

Another key factor to a successful antiterrorism campaign is the support of the government. The United States government has provided the resources, legislation, and direction for combating the threat of terrorism. However, another critical element of the nation's program for countering terrorists must be to change the way the nation perceives terrorism (Simon, 1990). Violent terrorist acts have generally brought swift condemnation by the government along with policy statements concerning the threat of terrorism and threats of retaliation. Strong emotional statements regarding terrorist action seldom serves to deter terrorists. Such statements serve to increase the publicity given to an event and raise an expectation among the public for swift and decisive action. Even if there is swift and successful action to capture the terrorists, future acts of terrorism create an impression that the system failed (Simon, 1995). Terrorism is not war, is not winnable, and it cannot be completely stopped. However, terrorism is not a significant threat to the national security. The government of the United States should view terrorism realistically and convey this realistic image to the public. The country is not powerless against terrorism, it can be limited, and it does not pose a significant threat to the American way of life. However, it does pose a threat to the safety of the public which should not be ignored. The government should lower public expectations concerning what can be done about terrorism and work to limit the amount of publicity that is given to terrorist actions.

Counterterrorism

Given the premise that terrorism cannot be completely stopped, agencies responsible for combating terrorism must possess the capability to respond to terrorist attacks. Programs designed to respond to terrorism once an attack has been conducted are referred to as counterterrorism programs (Tompkins, 1984). Counterterrorism programs include actions taken by law enforcement agencies once an attack is conducted, investigative procedures used to solve the crimes committed by terrorists, as well as measures taken by the legal system to prosecute captured terrorists. As the lead agency for combating terrorism in the United States, the FBI has been given the authority and the responsibility for investigating ongoing or suspected acts of terrorism; the agency also was made responsible for determining which acts should be labeled as terrorist (Smith, 1994).

The most likely agency to be the first at the scene of a terrorist incident is a local law enforcement agency. While perhaps no special terrorism expertise is required to secure the scene of a bombing, deal with a barricaded hostage situation, respond to an assassination, possessing a knowledge of terrorist motives and objectives may prove useful when examining the scene for clues or dealing with hostage takers. Also, like antiterrorism programs, counterterrorism programs need intelligence information concerning the terrorists' motives, modes of operation, weapons capabilities, and descriptions (Tompkins, 1984). As cited in the previous section, many local law enforcement agencies have scant intelligence resources and no guidelines for investigating terrorism or special units for dealing with terrorist attacks. However, these assets, although helpful, may not be

essential as long as swift and effective coordination exists with another agency possessing those assets, such as the FBI. The key to the timely involvement of the FBI is informing the agency of the existence of a suspected terrorist act. Again, this information flow may be hampered if there is poor communications between the local, state, and federal agencies. The Rand Corporation's study indicated that not all agencies have been made aware that suspected terrorist acts should be reported to the FBI. Also, an agency must first recognize the violent act as an act of terrorism. To develop the skills mentioned above, training may be conducted to familiarize agencies with terrorism. Of the 148 local police agencies surveyed, 107 received terrorism training (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).

Led by the FBI, the nation's counterterrorism efforts have generally proven to be successful. The FBI has made questionable progress against some of the Puerto Rican terrorist groups and knows very little about the Animal Liberation Front (Smith, 1994). However, most of the most significant terrorist organizations which committed terrorist attacks in the United States have been neutralized as a result of the counterterrorism effort. These groups include the M19CO, the UFF, the Jewish Defense League, The Order I and II, the White Patriot Party, and several others (Smith, 1994).

There is no official crime of terrorism in the United States. Terrorists are considered criminals and punished under the existing criminal codes. One advantage of this approach is that a captured terrorist is labeled a criminal and not a political prisoner, or some other title which might serve to legitimize their cause in any way (Jenkins, 1985). During the trial of Hampig Sassounian, an Armenian terrorist charged with the 1982 murder of the Turkish Consul-General in Los Angeles, his defense focused upon the

defendant's political motivations. However, Sassounian was judged solely as an individual who had been accused of committing a violent act, and was sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of parole. The harsh sentence combined with the connotation associated with having been officially deemed a criminal sent a message to all those law-abiding citizens who might have felt sympathy towards his cause (Hoffman, 1988).

Terrorists have often been arrested on lesser charges before the full scope of their terrorist involvement has been revealed by further investigation. An example is demonstrated in the prosecutions of some of the members of the M19CO involved in the 1981 robbery of a Brinks armored car in Nyack, New York. Before the investigation of the robbery was complete, two members were arrested, charged, and convicted for possessing illegal explosive devices. When the investigation of the robbery was complete prosecutors attempted to charge seven M19CO members with conspiracy; the case against the two who had previously been convicted of possessing illegal explosives was ruled as double jeopardy and dismissed (Smith, 1994). Prosecutors of terrorists have most often adopted a strategy of seeking indictments quickly on straightforward and traditional crimes to quickly incapacitate the terrorists. After the extent of terrorist activity has been determined, the prosecutors later have sought additional indictments on more complex racketeering and subversion charges. The terrorism trials of the M19CO and the UFF, and the 1986-1987 trial of thirteen white supremacists at Fort Smith, Arkansas were characterized by the prosecution strategy discussed above. Many of those standing trial had been previously convicted of criminal offenses and were already imprisoned at the time of the trial. The outcomes of the three trials demonstrate that the strategy used has

not been effective. All the defendants at the Fort Smith trial were acquitted. The trial of the UFF resulted in the defendants being acquitted on all major charges, and when the jury was unable to reach verdict on the other charges the judge declared a mistrial. The trial of the M19CO resulted in the cases of three of the seven defendants declared double jeopardy and dismissed, one defendant had escaped, and three plead guilty (Smith, 1994). Those accused of terrorism also retain the same rights as other criminals, and juries have been reluctant to impose excessive prosecution based upon concerns of double jeopardy. The lack of success in achieving convictions on racketeering and sedition does not indicate that prosecutions of terrorists have been unsuccessful. Initial prosecutions have been successful and instrumental in the disruption of many of the major terrorist organizations in America.

Again as in antiterrorism efforts, the support of the government is necessary for an effective counterterrorism program by providing the resources, legislation, and emphasis on combating terrorism. Similarly, the government plays a role in the manner in which the news media reports a terrorist incident. While obviously the government must respond in some manner to the public after a terrorist incident, such response should serve to downplay the publicity gained by the terrorists. When the media reports on the governments reaction to the terrorist incident, an image of calm and quiet resolve should be chosen over one of crisis (Simon, 1990).

In the case of normal law enforcement, the United States appears to be better prepared to react to crime than to take proactive measures to prevent crime. It therefore follows that since terrorism is a crime, it is not surprising that the United States is better

prepared to react to terrorism than to take proactive measures to prevent terrorist attacks. However, research has revealed that a strong antiterrorism foundation is present and the work of the FBI has been successful in preventing many terrorist acts. Both antiterrorism and counterterrorism are key elements in a national strategy to combat terrorism. However, more emphasis should be placed upon antiterrorism programs to prevent terrorism. A strategy based too much on counterterrorism is a strategy of accepted loss since it involves a response to a terrorist attack. The United States possesses an effective counterterrorism program, yet the antiterrorism component appears to vary significantly between federal, state, and local levels of preparedness to combat the threat of terrorism. Some state and local law enforcement agencies seem to be adequately prepared to address the growing threat that terrorism poses to the United States, while several do not.

Prospects for the Future

As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the United States has not been immune to terrorist violence and the threat of future terrorism is significant. However, the terrorist threat in the United States has not become, and is unlikely to become, a significant challenge to the government and the population as it has in many European and Middle Eastern nations (Smith, 1994). With the possible exception of the Puerto Rican extremists, there have been no terrorist organizations which have gathered enough widespread public sympathy and support to pose a significant challenge to the government of the United States (Hoffman & Taw, 1992). Although not a challenge to the government, terrorism is a significant threat to the safety of its citizens and combating the threat posed by terrorism has involved the expenditure of a significant amount of the

government's resources. Terrorism is a threat which must not be taken lightly and which must be combated because of the likelihood of continued terrorism, the increasing lethality of terrorism, and the impact it has had on national attention. As was demonstrated by the bombings of the World Trade Center and the federal building in Oklahoma City, single acts of terrorism can be spectacular and deadly.

Likelihood of Continued Terrorism

The prosecutions of left wing terrorist members have been effective in disrupting the left wing terrorist organizations. No terrorist acts have been attributed to one of these groups since 1985 (Smith, 1994). Recruiting for the left wing extremist organizations has always been difficult since Marxism never gained wide acceptance in the American work force and social classes have never been an important aspect of American society. Recruiting will most likely become more difficult with the almost total failure of Communism in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations. Having lost his primary source of financial and military aid, Fidel Castro has had to turn his attention to pressing domestic issues. Cuba's support of dissident American students and other leftist groups has consequently declined (Smith, 1994). The only left wing terrorist groups which may continue to be active are the Puerto Rican separatists. Although the voters of Puerto Rico chose to remain a commonwealth of the United States, extremist elements may continue the struggle for Puerto Rican independence (FBI, 1994).

Jewish terrorist activity in the United States has suffered a similar fate. Prosecutions and internal disputes within the Jewish Defense League have disrupted the organization (Hoffman, 1988). The main target of the organization, the Soviet Union, has

disappeared. The on-going peace process between Israel and the Palestinians may also serve to silence Jewish terrorists.

The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have also negatively impacted some international terrorist organizations. The three state sponsors of terrorism mostly responsible for anti-American terrorism, Syria, Libya, and Cuba, lost their primary source of financial and military aid with the demise of the Soviet Union. While the loss of resources by these countries may have limited their ability to export terrorism, the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism may serve to increase international terrorism (Smith, 1994). The FBI stated 'the most notable development of 1993 was the emergence of international radical fundamentalism both around the world and inside the United States,' (FBI, 1994, p. 26). The willingness of such fundamentalists to use random violence for political purposes was evidenced by the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. State sponsors of terrorism including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and the Sudan are also supporters of the radical fundamentalism and have remained active in supporting acts of terrorism (FBI, 1994). This favoritism has been attributed to the nature of extensive American overseas commercial interests, the presence of numerous American military bases in foreign countries, and to America's role as a world leader (Hoffman, 1993b). Therefore international terrorists have been largely attracted to American overseas assets because of their availability, the perceived difficulty of operating in and attacking targets in the United States, the symbolic value inherent in striking a blow against American expansionism, imperialism, or exploitation, and the virtual assurance of gaining widespread and massive publicity and exposure from the

American media (Hoffman, 1993b). Because of these reasons, the American assets overseas will remain an attractive target for terrorists. Also, as the only remaining superpower, the United States may be blamed for more of the world's ills and thus terrorist attacks may increase (Hoffman, 1993a).

More ominously, the successful bombing of the World Trade Center may have dispelled the perceived notion held by international terrorists concerning the difficulty of striking targets within the United States. Although the FBI reaction to the terrorist incident was swift and effective, the bombing was successful. The perceived psychological barrier which restrained international terrorists from attacking targets in the United States may have been breached which may in turn encourage more attacks (Hoffman, 1993b).

An area of concern is also terrorism for hire. In 1986, police raids on buildings used by a local Chicago street gang known as El Rukn turned up evidence that the gang had been conspiring to commit terrorist acts in the United States on behalf of Libya in exchange for money. The group claimed to be Moslem and was known to have close ties with Louis Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam. It was discovered that members of the gang had traveled to Central America to meet with representatives of the Libyan government, and had discussed plans to bomb government buildings and shoot down a commercial airliner in exchange for over two million dollars (Hoffman, 1988). Although the terrorist attacks and the money exchange never took place, the prospect of terrorist organizations hiring proxies to commit terrorist attacks in the United States warrants concern.

Concerning domestic terrorist organizations, the two groups which are expected to continue to be of concern are the right wing terrorist groups and the environmental terrorist groups. The motivations which guided the environmental terrorists are still present and although some members of the EMETIC have been imprisoned, other members are still free. Also, so little is known of the animal rights movement and the Animal Liberation Front that their activities can only be predicted to continue (Smith, 1994).

The most serious terrorist threat to the United States is posed by the right wing terrorist organizations. The members of these organizations have demonstrated that they are dedicated to their beliefs which they take seriously, and are willing to use violence to further their aims (Hoffman, 1988). They also have shown that they are capable of executing sophisticated terrorist attacks and have even contemplated large scale terrorist actions such as poisoning water supplies (Smith, 1994). These organizations have also bounced back from increased federal attention; when The Order was destroyed, The Order II rose to continue the attacks (Hoffman, 1988). Considering the right wing's view that minorities are parasites of society and to be blamed for society's ills, social conditions will aggravate their perceptions if unemployment increases, if affirmative action continues, if the economy slows, etc. It is likely that the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City and the increasing activities of the skinhead movement demonstrate that right wing extremists will continue to pose a terrorist threat to the United States.

The Rand Corporation sponsored a twenty four month survey of state and local preparedness for domestic terrorism which concluded in January, 1993. During the

research project, 39 state and 148 county and city law enforcement organizations were contacted. Of the state and local law enforcement organizations surveyed, 31 and 48 reported the existence of identified terrorist groups in their jurisdictions, respectively. The type of terrorist groups most frequently identified as being present were right wing organizations; single issue terrorists were the second most frequently cited (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).

Increasing Lethality

The increasing lethality of terrorism also dictates that the United States be prepared to combat the threat. During the eighties, terrorists killed more people than in the sixties and seventies combined (Hoffman, 1993a). The potential for a terrorist attack causing mass casualties poses a significant threat to the safety of the citizens of the United States. Again, the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City demonstrated that such an attack was possible and also that work must be done towards preventing similar attacks in the future.

One reason given for the increase in the lethality of terrorist attacks is that public attention is not as easily aroused due to the widespread media coverage given to the many different terrorist organizations and their actions. Consequently, terrorist attacks must be more spectacular and more bloody to compete for media attention, and casualties are always a news item. Because of the terrorists' desire to gain publicity and exposure for their cause or to create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, they seek media coverage for their attacks. Therefore terrorist attacks may become even more lethal as they vie for media coverage (Hoffman, 1993a).

Although many have theorized that terrorist groups have been averse to causing too many casualties, there have been indications that this trend may be changing. As mentioned above, the need for more spectacular attacks to gain media attention has seemed to promote increasing lethality of terrorist attacks which may bring about the emergence of super terrorism, which is the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons (Matthews, 1995). The threat posed by such an attack and the unacceptability of the consequences dictate that the nation be prepared to combat the threat of super terrorism.

Although nuclear weapons and nuclear technology are some of the most heavily guarded assets, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the reported poor accountability of all nuclear assets combined with the fact that more nations are gaining nuclear technology are causes for concern. The state sponsors of terrorism, most notably Iran and Libya, or terrorist organizations may be able to obtain nuclear devices by stealing from nations with less stringent security measures, by trading with nations experiencing economic difficulty, or by receipt of technology from other nations less friendly to the Western World such as North Korea or Pakistan (Nelán, 1995). Although much less likely, there is also the threat of an extremist organization attacking an American nuclear plant or weapon (deLeon, Hoffman, Kellen, & Jenkins, 1988).

Some terrorist organizations have already demonstrated a willingness to use chemical attacks. Most recently, the release of sarin gas in the subways of Japan by a terrorist group was reported (Hanson, 1995). Also, the investigations of the CSA uncovered a plot to pollute the water supply of Washington, D.C. with cyanide (Smith, 1994). Ethnic and religious fanaticism, possessed by such groups as the white supremacist

groups and Islamic fundamentalists, may possibly provide the motivation to engage in super terrorism. The right wing extremists, like the Islamic fundamentalists, view the use of violence not only as acceptable but necessary to eliminate unwanted segments of society for purification (Hoffman, 1988). Chemical weapons are as easily procurable as the ingredients for a bomb, and state sponsorship would make obtaining nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons conceivable (Hoffman, 1993b). Possessing the motive, right wing terrorists and Islamic fundamentalist terrorists may find the opportunity to engage in super terrorism.

Impact on National Attention

Although terrorism in the United States has caused relatively little damage when compared to other violent crime, natural disasters, and the like, terrorism has changed American society (Hoffman, 1988). After such events as the bombings of the World Trade Center and the federal building in Oklahoma City, much public and government attention was focused on terrorism. Significant amounts of money and other resources have been expended during the heightened tensions immediately following the attacks and for the clean-up after the attacks (President endorses, 1995). There were significant amounts of Congressional resources allocated to the investigation of terrorism after the attacks. American society has also experienced changes due to terrorism including heightened security at airports and some buildings (Pasternak & Ito, 1995). While this attention given to terrorism did not bankrupt the country or pose significant civil rights challenges, it could have been focused on other pressing domestic issues, and as terrorism increases so too will the amount of attention and resources devoted to it.

It is doubtful that the United States will experience the same degree of terrorism as Northern Ireland, Israel, and other nations; a revolution to overthrow the government is unlikely to gain widespread public support. However, because terrorism is likely to continue to exist in America and the lethality will potentially increase, the United States must remain vigilant. The threat of terrorism must be taken seriously to prevent the death and destruction it causes, as well as to ensure the availability of valuable government resources for other uses. Although terrorism is not likely to significantly alter the course of history, the threat that one violent attack could cause incredible damage and the threat of the illegal use of violence for political means warrant preparation and prevention.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

During the 1980s, terrorism emerged as a significant national policy issue.

Incidents such as the Iranian hostage affair and the bombing of the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon focused the attention of the public and the government on the threat of international terrorism, yet many failed to perceive any internal threat of any significance (Hoffman, 1988). After the Watergate hearings disclosed numerous incidents of FBI misconduct concerning security investigations conducted during the previous thirty years, the FBI's ability to investigate American citizens was severely limited and much of its intelligence section was dismantled. With the election of President Reagan in 1980, a government was ushered in which focused attention on terrorism (Smith, 1994).

Although domestic terrorist organizations were active in the seventies, their continued actions in the early eighties coupled with the increased emphasis the government had placed on terrorism led to changes within the FBI. Concerned about becoming involved in political policing again, the FBI initially resisted attempts to expand their program for combating terrorists (Smith, 1994). However, President Reagan forced the FBI to assume the leading role in the nation's strategy for combating domestic terrorism by issuing an Executive Order in 1982 which designated the FBI the lead agency for combating terrorism in America (Terrorism and America, 1993). Shortly thereafter,

the FBI elevated their program to combat terrorism to the highest priority (FBI, 1994). To broadly address the issue of international terrorism and specifically combat increasing levels of domestic left wing, Puerto Rican, and Jewish terrorism, the FBI's guidelines for investigating terrorism were broadened (Smith, 1994). These events shaped the nation's strategy for dealing with internal terrorism and paved the way for the FBI to aggressively investigate and neutralize many terrorist threats.

Americans largely held impressions that the United States was invulnerable to terrorism. These beliefs were based upon the fact that acts of terrorism committed in the United States had tended not to be spectacular and had not caused relatively many casualties. The impact of terrorism in the United States had been insignificant as compared to the problem of ordinary crime (Jenkins, 1980). However, during the period of time between 1980 and 1994, two hundred forty seven acts of terrorism occurred in the United States (Smith, 1994, & FBI, 1994). Terrorism committed at the beginning of the time period was committed mostly by left wing extremist representing Marxist and socialist holdovers from the sixties and seventies, Puerto Rican separatists, and Jews seeking to protest the Soviet Union's treatment of Jews. As the FBI's program for combating terrorism was rejuvenated and was disrupting the terrorist organizations mentioned above, several right wing organizations began to use violence to voice their white supremacist and Christian Identity ideals. The latter half of the eighties saw the emergence of environmental terrorism (Hoffman, 1988). Although international terrorists had also been active in the country, it was the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center by Islamic fundamentalists that eroded America's perceived invulnerability to terrorism

(Hoffman, 1993b). The 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City forced the people of the United States to realize that terrorist attacks could be committed in the United States by Americans against other Americans (The end of the innocence, 1995).

Armed with expanded powers and renewed federal interest and support, the FBI was successful in disrupting the activities of many terrorist organizations and even causing some to disband. No terrorist acts have been attributed to left wing or Jewish terrorists since the mid-eighties. Many right wing organizations and some environmental terrorist organizations have been completely neutralized (Smith, 1994, & FBI, 1994). However, the threat of terrorism remains. The threat posed to the United States by terrorism is likely to increase since many of the motivations which inspired the terrorists groups initially are still present and some groups have demonstrated an ability to bounce back after facing increased federal attention. Over sixty percent of the states indicated the presence of a terrorist threat within their jurisdiction during a 1991-1993 Rand Corporation research project (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). An identified trend of the increasing lethality of terrorist attacks, the potential for the use of weapons of mass destruction involving super terrorism, and the impact terrorism has on national attention warrants concern and preparation (Hoffman, 1993a).

To effectively combat the threat of terrorism, the agencies so responsible must include both proactive and reactive elements in their program (Seeger, 1990).

Antiterrorism, involving proactive and preventive measures, must receive a high priority. The effective and timely gathering, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information is crucial to the successful use of limited resources to combat threats as they appear. At

the national level, the FBI possesses an effective and relatively successful antiterrorism program as the lead agency for combating terrorism in the United States. The FBI has been successful in interdicting and preventing many terrorist attacks in the United States. Broadened investigative powers and the creation of a terrorism database have aided in the efforts of the FBI. However, many different federal agencies possess their own intelligence systems concerning terrorism, and no agency is privy to all the information at one time (Simon, 1990). Also, the federal government should refrain from making emotional statements to the media which serve to increase the public's expectation for quick and decisive action and to increase the amount of publicity given to terrorists, which is what they seek (Simon, 1990). Terrorism is a crime, not war, and like crime it will never be completely eliminated.

Agencies below the federal level responsible for combating terrorism, namely state and local law enforcement organizations, generally appear to be a mixed bag of preparedness. Many have indicated the existence of a terrorist threat within their jurisdiction. Several of the larger cities as well as agencies that had actually experienced terrorist incidents reported the existence of plans, joint meetings, intelligence units, and the like for combating terrorism. However, many agencies lack the resources to devote to terrorism programs and are hampered by state laws prohibiting the investigations based upon a groups political or social ideologies. Many agencies possess no contingency plans for dealing with terrorism, and of the plans that do exist many were not coordinated with the FBI or any external agency. Many agencies reported never having liaised with the FBI concerning terrorism issues. Finally, research indicated the possible existence of

communications problems between local, state, and federal agencies involved in combating terrorism. Some agencies may not have been aware that the FBI was the lead agency for combating terrorism and that all suspected acts of terrorism should be reported to them. In addition, the numbers of terrorist incidents reported by state and local agencies significantly exceeded the numbers recorded by the FBI. Some variation was explained by the fact that later investigation by the FBI may have determined some suspected acts of terrorism were in fact not, however, the state and local agencies applied a broader definition of terrorism than did the FBI (Riley & Hoffman, 1988). This fact is understandable considering the ambiguity involved in trying to define terrorism. In contrast, many of the larger cities had established regional joint counterterrorism task forces and working groups demonstrating a very close relationship between the FBI and state and local law enforcement agencies (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).

The above findings were generally supported by research conducted locally in South Carolina. Some law enforcement agencies, especially in the state capital, reported the existence of functional and effective communications with the FBI concerning terrorism. Another city law enforcement agency cited a lack of information sharing on the part of federal agencies (Wiley, 1995). All agencies mentioned the existence of numerous sources of intelligence information at the federal level which may point to the lack of a central oversight entity to ensure coordination and efficient use of information. Representatives indicated their agencies had planned for dealing with terrorism and shared pertinent information they acquired with the FBI as well as other local agencies. It is interesting to note that the research for the Rand Corporation survey was completed in

January 1993, one month prior to the bombing of the World Trade Center (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Since the World Trade Center bombing and the Oklahoma City bombing, it would be reasonable to assume many law enforcement agencies re-examined the potential terrorist threats in their areas and their plans to cope with them.

After an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in 1984, a statement issued by the Irish Republican Army declared, "Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always," (Simon, 1990, p. 3). However, the government cannot always be lucky. Therefore, a successful campaign against terrorism must include those reactive elements known as counterterrorism (Seeger, 1990). The American policing system has generally been better at reactive police work than proactive police work. The same is true for police agencies combating terrorism in the United States. Since terrorism is treated as a crime, many of the same tools are used to react to it as are used to react to normal crimes. Although many state and local law enforcement agencies reported they did not possess special guidelines for investigating terrorism or special terrorism units, the FBI does possess these tools has the authority and responsibility to investigate ongoing or suspected terrorist activities (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). The FBI has been generally successful in dealing with terrorist as has been discussed in detail elsewhere in this study. The courts have likewise been successful in prosecuting terrorists, although the strategy used by prosecutors has not been successful. Terrorists have been prosecuted successfully on relatively simple, straight-forward charges, yet attempts to convict the same terrorist with the more complex charges such as conspiracy and sedition have been largely unsuccessful

(Smith, 1994). As with antiterrorism, the government should seek to minimize the amount of publicity gained by the terrorist incident, and project an image of calm and control as opposed to one of crisis (Simon, 1990).

The threat terrorism poses to the United States will not likely challenge the government, gain widespread popular support among a majority of the population, or disrupt the American way of life. Terrorists are not likely to establish themselves to the extent they have in the United Kingdom, the Middle East, or Germany (Hoffman & Taw, 1992). However, the successful bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City which ended the lives of 167 Americans, including children, served to demonstrate that terrorism can be spectacular, lethal, and costly (Griffin, 1995). Because the threat is likely to increase, and especially because of the potential threat posed by super terrorism, the United States must be prepared to effectively combat terrorism and prevent the commission of violent terrorist attacks if at all possible. Terrorist attacks, especially attack of super terrorism, could be costly. Although the federal government is prepared to combat the threat, more effort is required to increase the preparedness of state and local agencies and to improve communications between all agencies involved.

Although the use of terrorism has not significantly altered the course of human history, the possibility that a single, violent act can shatter the fragile balance of human society demands vigilance on the part of the polity as they attempt to control this unique form of criminal expression. (Smith, 1994, p. 201)

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